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This paper highlights the potential for joint OECD (or non-OPEC) carbon taxes to reduce 
OPEC’s monopoly rent and provide benefit to non-OPEC countries provided jointly agreed 
trigger strategies are adhered to. In traditional economic theory, the primary purpose of a 
carbon tax is to internalize a global negative externality. A second benefit for individual 
countries is that the revenue raised by carbon tax can be used to reduce other tax rates and so 
lower the deadweight loss of tax system. In this paper, we discuss a third benefit of carbon 
taxes: transferring rents from OPEC to the oil importing countries. 
We develop a multi-region general equilibrium structure with endogenously determined oil 
supply for the purpose in which emissions are endogenously determined. We calibrate our 
model to 2006 data. Our analytics and numerical simulation results highlight how a uniform 
carbon tax used by all non-OPEC countries will increase the buyer’s price of oil but decrease 
the supplier’s price of oil, thus decreasing non-OPEC countries’ oil demand, and transferring 
OPEC monopoly rent to non-OPEC countries. Carbon taxes reduce the welfare of OPEC and 
increase the welfare of non-OPEC countries. Results also show how carbon taxes reduce 
global emissions, but the effect is small. 
JEL Code: Z19. 
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1.   Introduction 
      This paper discusses the role of jointly applied non-OPEC carbon taxes supported 
by appropriate trigger price mechanisms in reducing OPEC’s monopoly rent. A 
carbon tax is an environmental tax on emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases, the purpose of which is to slow climate change by reducing 
emissions. With concerns over severe effects from global warming, some major 
economies have paid much attention to carbon tax, and limited taxes of this type been 
enacted in some European Union countries, such as Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Italy and The United Kingdom. There are also similar proposals in U.S., 
Canada, and some developing countries, such as China. Another important issue is 
that OPEC has monopoly power in the world oil market and extracts significant 
monopoly rent. In this paper, we combine these issues and discuss how a jointly 
implemented non-OPEC countries’ carbon tax can also reduce OPEC’s monopoly 
power to the advantage of the non-OPEC. 
   Traditional economic theory sees pollution as a negative externality and the 
primary purpose of a carbon tax is to internalize such a negative externality. This was 
discussed by Pigou(1938) as the internalization of externalities using Pigouvian Tax. 
Later, Terkla(1984), Pearce(1991) and others discussed the “double dividend” from a 
carbon tax; a carbon tax will not only reduces the distortionary loss from the 
externality, the revenue raised by the tax can also be used to reduce other 
distortionary taxes, and so lower the deadweight loss of tax system. Globally, there is 
a cleaner environment with less global warming, while also improving incentives for 
productive activities.   
   In this paper, we discuss a third benefit to non-OPEC countries from a joint 
carbon tax with appropriate supporting trigger strategies: transferring rents from 
OPEC to the oil importing countries. Carbon taxes reduce the consumption of oil in 
importing countries, reduce OPEC’s production price of oil and rents are transferred 
to the non-OPEC oil importing countries. Lerner (1980) proposed a plan for using 
taxes in this way to break OPEC. He advocated that a specific tax with trigger - 4 - 
strategies that the United States and governments of oil-consuming countries impose a 
100 percent excise tax on the difference between OPEC’s price and the pre-OPEC 
price adjusted for inflation. Lerner’s plan would double consumers’ elasticity of 
demand causing them to demand less oil at higher prices and thus reduce the strength 
of the cartel. His plan was not promoted for environmental purposes and was never 
adopted, but our analysis is in the spirit of this proposal. In discussing the possible 
influences of environmental agreements on OPEC, a range of present oil-economy 
models estimate that OPEC will lose from the Kyoto Protocol(see Barnett et 
al.(2004),Ghanem et al.(1999), McKibbin et al.(1999), Bernstein et al.(1999)), but 
none have linked these effects to the carbon tax in numerical modeling. 
   We develop a multi-region general equilibrium structure in which countries 
produce commodities of varying emissions intensities using substitutable fossil fuel 
based oil and non-oil inputs as in Dong & Whalley (2009). Unlike in conventional 
trade models in which there is a fixed endowment of factor inputs for each country, 
here we model a supply function for each country reflecting increasing extraction 
costs. We model the extraction cost function in constant elasticity form to yield a 
specification consistent with alternative values of the supply elasticity of oil. To our 
knowledge, this structure, while simple, is novel in numerical work.   
   We next turn to numerical simulation, and using a number of data sources 
construct a benchmark global equilibrium data set based on data for 2006. This covers 
production, consumption , and trade for five regions (China,EU,US,OPEC,ROW) .We 
calibrate our model to this data set using literature based estimates of key elasticities, 
with the exception of production function elasticities which we determine using data 
on oil prices and marginal cost and Lerner’s pricing rule for monopoly producers. 
    Results show that a uniform carbon tax used by non-OPEC countries increases 
the oil-importing countries welfare and income, reduces OPEC’s welfare and income, 
and transfers monopoly rents from OPEC to oil-importing countries. The higher the 
carbon tax, the more rent will be transferred. And carbon taxes also reduce global 
emissions, but the effect is small.   - 5 - 
2.    A Model of Carbon Tax and OPEC Monopoly Rent Transfers 
      We first present our carbon tax model in algebraic form. As we focused on OPEC, 
we make the strong assumption that oil is the only source of energy. There are five 
regions,  1, 5 i = L   China, EU, US, OPEC and ROW, there are two goods produced in 
each region, j=1,2. In production, good 1 has high oil cost intensity, and good 2 has 
low oil cost intensity. The model specifies two factors, N a non-oil input, which is 
immobile across countries, but mobile across sectors within a country, and E an oil 
input which is mobile across both countries and sectors. 
On the production side, we consider a two sector (a high oil (emission) intensity 
good and a low oil (emission) intensity good), two factor (oil and non oil input) 
structure. We assume production is CES. The production function for each good in 
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where  ij Y is the output of good j produced in country i, and s σ is the elasticity of 
substitution between the two inputs (assumed similar across countries). iN p is the price 
of the non-oil input in country i, goods prices are ij P .We assume that oil is mobile 
across countries, so that the producer price of oil in each country (the world price) is 
the same  E p .  tc is the common carbon tax rate .The buyer’s price of oil  EB p  is 
(1 ) EB E p pt c =+                                                 ( 2 )      
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        Unlike traditional general equilibrium models which use a fixed endowment of 
oil, here, by introducing an extraction cost function for each country into the model, 
oil supply by country is now endogenously determined. The extraction cost function 
we use implies an increasing marginal cost of extraction and is written as 
            
3
2 1 ) (
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i i i i i i Q B B Q F K + = =                               ( 6 )  
where  i K is the extraction cost in country i, and  i Q   is oil extraction in 
countryi. 
From the first-order conditions for the extraction cost function, we get   
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and the oil supply elasticity is   
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Dividing the extraction cost function by the oil price, we can calculate the 
resources that are used in oil extraction. 
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  On the demand side of the model, the representative household utility function 
in each country is       
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This utility function follows Cai, Riezman & Whalley (2009). i RX  is composite 
consumption in country i, while  T Δ  is global temperature change. i H is composite 
high emission goods consumption,  i L   is composite low emission goods consumption, 
d σ is the substitution elasticity between high and low emission goods,  β  reflects  the 
assumed severity of damage from temperature change. In this specification, C can be 
thought of as the global temperature change at which all economic activity ceases (say, - 7 - 
20℃). In this formulation, as  T Δ  approaches C, utility goes to zero; and as  T Δ  
goes to zero, there is no welfare impact of temperature change.   
For the final good demand functions, i RX  is a two level nested CES function. 
Each region is assumed to maximize utility by first choosing among high and low oil 
(emission) intensity goods, and each region then chooses using among domestic 
goods and the other country goods at a second level. 
         11 21 1 2 (,, , ) ii i i r i r RX f X X X X = L                             (11) 
Each of the five regions maximizes top level utility subject to a budget 
constraint. i I is income in country  i.  
         i
i j
i ij i ij I X P = ∑
′
′ ′                                           ( 1 2 )  
    Income  includes  non-oil  income,  oil income, tariff revenue, carbon tax revenue 
and transfers from abroad (financing net goods import and net oil import). 
 [] ii N i N E ii i i i I pW pQ K R R C T R =+ − + + +                      ( 1 3 )  
      For  country  i, iN p is the price of non-oil input, iN W is the non-oil 
endowment, i K is the extraction cost of oil, and  i Q is oil extraction in country i. i R  
is tariff revenue,  i RC  is carbon tax revenue, and  i TR  are exogenous transfers 
between countries (net goods import plus net oil import). These can be zero, but 
incorporating them allows calibration to unbalanced trade data.   
            Figure 1 shows the structure of the two level nested CES utility functions used.  
For each good j produced in country i’, we define the seller’s price (net of tariff) 
as i j p ′, and allow each country i to impose tariffs at rate  iji t ′  (  countryi’s tariff on 
good  j   imported from country  i′) on each imported good. Tariffs are set to zero 
for exports. Internal (gross of tariff ) prices for good j produced in country i’ are 
thus 
     ' [1 ] iji ji iji Pt P ′′ =+                                          ( 1 4 )  - 8 - 
 
    Temperature  change  in  physical  form is assumed to be a function of oil 
consumption, i.e. 
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      In equilibrium, goods and factor markets clear. Goods market clearing implies:   
j i
i
i ij Y X ′ ′ = ∑    1, 5 i = L   j = 1 , 2                               ( 1 6 )  
    Non-oil inputs are only mobile across sectors within regions and immobile 
across regions, so each region’s non-oil input use equals its non-oil endowment. The 
non-oil factor clearing conditions are: 
iN
j
ij W N = ∑    1, 5 i = L   j = 1 , 2                               ( 1 7 )                
      Oil is mobile across countries and so global oil consumption equals global oil 
extraction. The oil clearing condition is:     
  ij i
ij i
EQ = ∑∑ ∑                                           ( 1 8 )  
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3.   Data  and  Parameterization 
We build a model compatible benchmark general equilibrium data set which we 
use in calibration. Our base case include 2006 trade, production, and consumption 
data (as well as oil use) for a 2 good (energy /non energy intensive), 2 factor (oil 
inputs, other inputs) structure for 5 regions (China, US , EU, OPEC,ROW).   
   In Table 1-1 ,GDP data is from the World Bank’s WDI database and  OPEC 
Annual Statistics Bulletin 2007. The high-emission sector in each country is taken to 
be the manufacturing industry. The low-emission sector in each country is taken to be 
the service and agricultural sectors. For Table 1-2, trade data is taken from the 
UNCOMTRADE database, and F.o.b. export values as reported by exporting 
countries are used. In Table 1-3 , oil use and trade data for 2006 are calculated from 
IEA oil statistics. The unit of account used in the IEA statistics data is thousands of 
tonnes of oil equivalent, which we adjust to billion US dollars, (1 toe=7.33 barrel of 
oil equivalent, oil price (average)=$61.08/per barrel) .The extraction cost is calculated 
using the IEA energy balance table. In the data presented in Table 1-4 , adjustments 
are made to consumption so as to be compatible with GDP minus exports. There are 
also some small differences in goods classifications between the underlying 
consumption, production and tariff rate data. Table 1-5 gives energy consumption 
data from IEA statistics. 
 - 10 - 
Table 1    Data Sources Used in Model Calibration 
Table 1-1    2006 GDP by Sector by Region (Billion $) 
  China EU-27  US  OPEC  ROW 
  High Low  High Low  High Low  High Low  High  Low 
GDP by 
sector   1279.23 1378.64 3852.48 10694.22 3006.63 10157.27 1169.39 1084.26  4249.39  11755.19 
GDP  2657.87    14546.7  13163.9  2253.65    16004.58  
Source: World Bank’s WDI database, OPEC Annual Statistics Bulletin2007. 
Table 1-2    2006 Bilateral Trade Data (Billion $) 
Import by  Export by 
(Billion $)  China EU-27  US  OPEC  ROW World 
High 0.00  159.05  139.22  32.20  364.00  694.47 
Low 0.00  85.42  64.58  8.80  115.66  274.46  China 
Total 0.00  244.47  203.80  41.00  479.66  968.93 
High 64.00  0.00 268.93  96.77 693.34  1123.04 
Low 15.29  0.00  65.82  24.60  230.71  336.42  EU-27 
Total 79.29  0.00 334.75  121.37 924.05  1459.46 
High 35.33 159.52  0.00  36.08 535.94  766.87 
Low 19.89 59.63  0.00 8.80  181.84  270.16  US 
Total 55.22 219.15  0.00  44.88 717.78  1037.03 
High 20.20 147.08 113.10 0.00 388.91  669.29 
Low 3.47  15.09  9.27  0.00  72.09  99.92  OPEC 
Total 23.67 162.17 122.37 0.00 461.00 769.21 
High 499.54  774.89  928.83 74.77  0.00  2278.03 
Low 133.74 297.04  329.24 90.86  0.00 850.88  ROW 
Total 633.28 1071.93 1258.07  165.63  0.00 3128.91 
High 619.07 1240.54 1450.08  239.82 1982.19  5531.70 
Low 172.39 457.18  468.91  133.06  600.30  1831.84  World 
Total 791.46 1697.72 1918.99  372.88 2582.49 7363.54 
Source: UNCOMTRADE database 
Table 1-3    2006 Oil Balance Data (Billion $) 
  Extrac- 
tion  Import Export Net 
Import 
Extraction 







China  82.76   85.17   -9.70   75.47  22.09 136.14    76.27   59.87 
Eu27  54.16   431.42   -160.86   270.56  35.28 289.44  205.12   84.33 
US  142.29   321.18   -29.20   291.97  35.82 398.44  307.09   91.35 
OPEC  782.97   35.92   -635.90   -599.98  39.71  143.27  103.03   40.23 
ROW  741.96   589.48   -627.50   -38.02  112.57  591.37  398.40  192.97 
World  1804.14   1463.17   -1463.17   0.00 245.47  1558.67  1089.92  468.75 
Source: IEA oil statistics - 11 - 
Table 1-4    Consumption of Domestic Goods (2006) (Billion $) 






China  584.76 1104.18 
Eu27  2729.44 10357.80 
US  2239.76 9887.11 
OPEC  500.10 984.34 
ROW  1971.36 10904.31 
 
 
Table 1-5    Energy Consumption (Billion US $) 
Year China  EU-27 US  ROW  World 
2006  412.96    483.69 593.20 1446.90 2936.75   
2036  80910.18   21510.37  30878.64  88533.37  221832.56  
2056  612633.64    47336.00 76757.82 250518.18 987245.64   
Source: International Energy Agency: Key World Energy Statistics, 2008. 
As for elasticities, in the central case , model analyses elasticity parameters are 
used as follows: the consumption elasticity, that is the substitution elasticity between 
high and low emission goods in consumption is equal to 0.5, and the trade elasticity , 
The substitution elasticities between domestic and imported commodities follows the 
“rule of two”, that is the substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods 
is equal to 2, as discussed in Hertel al. (2009). This rule was first proposed by Jomini 
et al.(1991) and later tested by Liu, Arndt,and Hertel(2002) in a back-casting exercise 
with a simplified version of the GTAP model.   
For the production substitution elasticity, we assume values are the same in all 
countries and we use Lerner pricing by OPEC to calibrate them to the base data on the 
P-MC difference for oil extraction. We relate this difference to the implied oil demand 
elasticity, in non-OPEC countries as a point estimate at the benchmark equilibrium. 






=                                          ( 1 9 )  
where E p   is the price of oil,  E MC   is the marginal cost of oil, and  E ε  is the 
price elasticity of oil demand. Thus if the oil price is ,say $ 60/per barrel, and the - 12 - 
marginal extraction cost is $ 12, by equation (19), we get  1.25 E ε = . We obtain the 
production side substitution elasticity  s σ by iterative calculation of the arc estimate of 
the demand elasticity for oil facing OPEC in the model at the benchmark equilibrium. 
As shown in table 2 ,when  5.2 s σ = , the arc estimate of demand of oil produced in 
OPEC equals 1.25. 
Using data for 2006,2036, and 2056 in table 1-5, and assuming the temperature 
change at these three points to be 0℃,2℃, and 5℃ respectively, we can solve for the 
values of parameters a,b,and c in equation (15) as 
  c a + =
b 2936.75) - 2936.75 ( 0 
c a + =
b 221832.56) ( 2 
c a + =
b )   987245.64 ( 5 
    Solving these equations for the parameters a,b,and c yields values of 0.0010,     
0.6137 and 0. Substituting these values in the temperature equation yields 
                       
0.6137




ij E E g T           ( 2 0 )  
   Assuming a temperature change  T Δ of 5℃ between 2006 and 2056 (consistent 
with Stern(2002)), Table 2 reports the calibrated preference parameters in equation 
(10) under alternative damage assumptions. As discussed in Cai et al.(2009), the share 
parameter  β  reflects the assumed severity of damage from temperature change. We 
assume 3% utility loss and  1059 . 0 = β . 
 Table 2 also reports remaining parameter values in production, preferences and 
extraction cost functions generated by calibration. These are independent of the 
assumed utility damage due to temperature change. 
 - 13 - 
Table  2  Calibrated  Parameters  
A． Production  Elasticity 
World oil demand 
production 
elasticity 
Base value  New value 
(1% increase of oil price) 
Arc estimate at 
benchmark 
equilibrium of 





Elasticity of world 
demand on OPEC oil 
5.00 1558.6700  1484.9610  4.7290  25.43%  1.2028 
5.20  1558.6700 1482.0970  4.9127 25.43%  1.2495 
5.30 1558.6700  1480.6660  5.0045  25.43%  1.2729 
5.50 1558.6700  1477.8090  5.1878  25.43%  1.3195 
B．  Assumed Changes in Preference Parameters 
Assumed utility loss in 
BAU  1%  3%  5% 10%  15%  20% 
Utility relative to no 
damage 
0.99  0.97  0.95 0.9 0.85 0.8 
β   0.0349  0.1059  0.1783 0.3662 0.5649 0.7757 
C．  Parameters in CES production functions 

































coefficient  1.747566 1.704759  1.732102  1.519990  1.823222  1.506749 1.802201 1.684137 1.811027 1.584846 
shares on oil    0.005717 0.004621  0.005300  0.001409  0.008197  0.001550 0.007424 0.004156 0.007739 0.002373 
shares on 
non-oil   0.090174 0.101797  0.094239  0.177333  0.072058  0.170744 0.076837 0.107844 0.074810 0.142189 
D.  Parameters in Nested CES Utility functions 
Shares of high and low energy (emission) composite goods 
  China EU-27  US  OPEC  ROW 





























  0.628868 0.777512  0.262631  0.964896  0.244520  0.969644 0.475327 0.879809 0.232531 0.972589 
Shares of consumption of high energy (emission) domestic and import goods 
  China EU-27  US  OPEC  ROW 
China-H  0.124109  0.011915 0.010496 0.012533 0.021514 
EU-H  0.016138  0.189772 0.020276 0.037665  0.04098 
US-H  0.008909  0.01195  0.158553 0.014043 0.031677 
OPEC-H  0.005094  0.011018 0.008527 0.163924 0.022986 
ROW-H  0.125965  0.058049 0.070028 0.029102 0.103232 
Shares of consumption of low energy (emission) domestic and import goods 
China-L  0.322971 0.005331  0.00373  0.003729  0.005801 
EU-L  0.005997  0.488794 0.003801 0.010425 0.011571 
US-L  0.007801  0.003722 0.51301 0.003729 0.00912 
OPEC-L  0.001361 0.000942  0.000535  0.33585  0.003616 
ROW-L  0.052457  0.018538 0.019014 0.038506 0.436446 
E.  Parameters in Extraction functions 
  China EU-27  US  OPEC  ROW 
Constant Parameter  -33.0833 -0.8267  -59.0400  -482.2700  -382.0700 
Coefficient parameter  0.0733  0.0906 0.0559 0.0238 0.0245   14
4 .    Model Experiments and Results for Carbon Tax and OPEC 
Monopoly Rent Transferring 
We have used our calibrated model to simulate the impacts of using a joint carbon 
tax by non-OPEC countries on global emissions and country welfare. The results of 
these experiments show that a uniform carbon tax used by non-OPEC countries will 
increase the buyer’s price of oil and decreasing the producer price of oil, and thus 
decrease non-OPEC countries’ oil demand, and transfer OPEC’s monopoly rent to 
non-OPEC countries. A jointly implemented carbon tax with supporting trigger price 
strategies can thus reduce the welfare of OPEC and increase the effect of the welfare 
of non-OPEC countries. Non-OPEC countries’ income increases from two sources: 
one is OPEC rent transferring, the other is carbon tax revenue. Carbon tax can 
decrease global emissions, but the effect is small. 
In Tables 3 — 7, we assume a uniform carbon tax rate adopted by non-OPEC 
countries (China, EU, US, ROW). By increasing the tax rate, we can analyze the 
effect of the carbon tax on oil price, oil demand, income, welfare and emissions. 
Table 3 shows the impact of uniform carbon tax on the buyer’s oil price. By 
increasing the carbon tax rate, the seller’s price of oil will decrease and buyer’s price 
of oil will increase. When the carbon tax rate is at 1%,3%,5%,10%,15% and 20%, the 
seller’s price of oil will change -0.8745%, -2.5727%, -4.2061% , -8.0232%, 
-11.4900% and -14.6397% accordingly, and the buyers price in all countries will 
change by 0.1168%, 0.3501%, 0.5836%,1.1745%,1.7864% and 2.4323% accordingly. 
 
Table 3    Impacts of Uniform Carbon Tax on Buyer’s Oil Price 
(% Change Based on 2006 Data) 
% Change in Oil Price 
CARBON TAX 
China   EU  US  OPEC  ROW  Total 
1% uniform carbon tax  0.1168% 0.1168%  0.1168%  -0.8745%  0.1168% 0.1168% 
3% uniform carbon tax  0.3501% 0.3501%  0.3501%  -2.5727%  0.3501% 0.3501% 
5% uniform carbon tax  0.5836% 0.5836%  0.5836%  -4.2061%  0.5836% 0.5836% 
10% uniform carbon tax  1.1745% 1.1745%  1.1745%  -8.0232%  1.1745% 1.1745% 
15% uniform carbon tax  1.7864% 1.7864%  1.7864%  -11.4900%  1.7864% 1.7864% 
20% uniform carbon tax  2.4323% 2.4323%  2.4323%  -14.6397%  2.4323% 2.4323% 
   15
Table 4 reports the consumption of oil in non-OPEC importing countries reducing 
with the increasing of carbon tax rate. When the carbon tax rate is 1%, the oil demand 
of China, EU, US and ROW decreases by 0.5683%, 0.5800%, 0.5555%, 0.5755%. 
When the carbon tax rate increases to 10%, the oil demand of China, EU, US and 
ROW decreases by 5.4613%, 5.6185%, 5.3800%, 5.5395%. 
Table 4    Impacts of Uniform Carbon tax on Oil Demand 
(% Change Based on 2006 Data) 
% Change in Oil Demand 
CARBON TAX 
China   EU  US  OPEC  ROW  Total 
1% uniform carbon tax  -0.5683% -0.5800%  -0.5555%  4.2179% -0.5755% -0.1300% 
3% uniform carbon tax  -1.6836% -1.7228%  -1.6495%  13.0357%  -1.7063% -0.3379% 
5% uniform carbon tax  -2.7773% -2.8478%  -2.7263%  22.3700%  -2.8160% -0.4807% 
10% uniform carbon tax  -5.4613% -5.6185%  -5.3800%  48.0031%  -5.5395% -0.5853% 
15% uniform carbon tax  -8.1402% -8.3878%  -8.0381%  76.9330%  -8.2541% -0.3840% 
20% uniform carbon tax  -10.8776% -11.2118% -10.7574% 109.0923% -11.0208%  0.0634% 
 
The results in Table 3 and Table 4 thus confirm the idea that taxation in an 
importing country implies a transfer of rents from producers to consumers. Since 
OPEC has high monopoly power in oil production, a jointly implemented carbon tax 
functions as an effective way to reduce OPEC’s monopoly power. 
Table 5 reports the influence of carbon taxes on OPEC and non-OPEC country’s 
incomes. Non-OPEC countries increase their income due to rent transfers from OPEC 
and carbon tax revenue. When the carbon tax rate is 3%, the income of China, EU, US 
and ROW increases by 0.0937%, 0.0540%, 0.0663%, 0.0034%, OPEC’s income falls 
by 1.0598%. When the carbon tax rate increases to 20%, the income of China, EU, 
US and ROW increases by 0.8187%, 0.3943%,0.5137%,0.2590%. OPEC’s income 
falls by 5.3335%. For non-OPEC countries, the income increases are small.   16
Table 5    Impacts of Uniform Carbon Tax on Income 
(% Change Based on 2006 Data) 
% Change in Income 
CARBON TAX 
China   EU  US  OPEC  ROW  Total 
1% uniform carbon tax  0.0279% 0.0171%  0.0206%  -0.3664%  -0.0019% -0.0022% 
3% uniform carbon tax  0.0937% 0.0540%  0.0663%  -1.0598%  0.0034% 0.0005% 
5% uniform carbon tax  0.1683% 0.0932%  0.1158%  -1.7044%  0.0178% 0.0103% 
10% uniform carbon tax  0.3778% 0.1954%  0.2483%  -3.1282%  0.0806% 0.0554% 
15% uniform carbon tax  0.6002% 0.2974%  0.3835%  -4.3241%  0.1656% 0.1178% 
20% uniform carbon tax  0.8187% 0.3943%  0.5137%  -5.3335%  0.2590% 0.1868% 
 
    In Table 6, we use Hicksian CV and EV measures capturing the effects of 
temperature  change  for  welfare  analysis.  These  are                         
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Since the temperature change is small,  01 TT Δ ≈Δ , and CV and EV measures from 
equations (21) and (22) are similar. We only report the CV measure. Results show 
that non-OPEC countries improve welfare and OPEC loses welfare. When the carbon 
tax rate is 5%, CV measures for China, EU, US and ROW are 0.000043, 3.710793, 
4.440146, 0.487235, CV of OPEC is -5.122175, When the carbon tax rate is 20%, CV 
measures for China, EU, US and ROW are 0.000216, 15.897682, 20.049688 , 
10.130895. The CV of OPEC is -15.12791. 
Table 6    Impacts of Uniform Carbon tax on welfare (CV) 
Change in Welfare by Region (CV) 
CARBON TAX 
China EU US  OPEC  ROW  Total 
1% uniform carbon tax  0.000007 0.672325  0.774374  -1.115139  -0.138067 0.286138 
3% uniform carbon tax  0.000023 2.140034  2.520218  -3.205549  -0.022011 4.100982 
5% uniform carbon tax  0.000043 3.710793  4.440146  -5.122175  0.487235 12.503942 
10% uniform carbon tax  0.000098 7.841789  9.630654  -9.238164  2.924413 12.503942 
15% uniform carbon tax  0.000158 11.981790  14.953226  -12.526053 6.339063 22.907469 
20% uniform carbon tax  0.000216 15.897682  20.049688  -15.127910 10.130895 33.906084 
   17
Table 7 reports the effects of carbon tax on emissions. The global emissions 
decrease with an increasing carbon tax rate, but the effect is small. When the uniform 
carbon tax rate is 20%, global emissions decrease by 3.3599%. Across different 
regions, OPEC increases emissions since OPEC does not use a carbon tax, while 
non-OPEC countries decrease emissions due to reduced oil consumption. 
 
Table7    Impacts of Uniform Carbon Tax on Emissions(Oil Use) 
(% Change Based on 2006 Data) 
% Change    in Emissions 
CARBON TAX 
China   EU  US  OPEC  ROW  Total 
1% uniform carbon tax  -0.5683% -0.5800%  -0.5555%  4.2179%  -0.5756% -0.2671% 
3% uniform carbon tax  -1.6836% -1.7229%  -1.6495%  13.0357% -1.7063% -0.7590% 
5% uniform carbon tax  -2.7773% -2.8478%  -2.7263%  22.3700% -2.8160% -1.1997% 
10% uniform carbon tax  -5.4612% -5.6185%  -5.3800%  48.0031% -5.5395% -2.1121% 
15% uniform carbon tax  -8.1402% -8.3878%  -8.0381%  76.9330% -8.2541% -2.8121% 
20% uniform carbon tax  -10.8776% -11.2118% -10.7574% 109.0923%  -11.0208% -  3.3599% 
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5.   Concluding  Remarks 
We have used a multi-region general equilibrium model calibrated to 2006 
benchmark data to evaluate the impacts of jointly imposed carbon taxes on OPEC and 
non-OPEC countries’ oil consumption, income, emissions and welfare. Our results 
confirm the view that carbon taxes can have a third benefit for oil importing countries 
of transferring rents from OPEC to oil importing countries and reducing OPEC’s 
monopoly power on oil market. 
Results from model analysis also show that a uniform carbon tax by non-OPEC 
countries will increase the buyer’s price of oil and decrease the seller’s price of oil, 
thus decreasing non-OPEC countries’ oil demand, and transferring OPEC’s monopoly 
rent to non-OPEC countries. A carbon tax thus reduces the welfare of OPEC and 
increases the welfare of non-OPEC countries. Non-OPEC countries’ income can 
increase from two sources: one is OPEC rent transfers; the other is from carbon tax 
revenue. A non-OPEC carbon tax can decrease global emissions, but the effect is 
small. 
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